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BOOK REVIEW
Revenue Sharing: Crutch or Catalyst for State and Local Governments? By Henry S. Reuss. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.
Pp. 170. $6.50.
This short, readable, and relatively nontechnical book purports to
argue for federal revenue sharing, but often the argument is obscured behind a never-ending tirade against state and local governments. The
author, a Democratic Congressman from Wisconsin, engages in too much
visionary reformism to present the case for revenue sharing.
Federal revenue sharing is a plan for distributing a specified portion
of federal revenues (usually derived from individual income tax receipts) to state and local governments. 1 Under traditional proposals, few
qualifying criteria or conditions controlling the use of funds would be
attached.2 Allocation would be on a per capita basis, modified to give
credit for above-average efforts of the states in taxation and to achieve
some interstate equalization through bonus payments to low-income states.
Revenue-sharing funds would not be subject to the annual process of
appropriation, but would be placed in trust. They would supplement,
not supplant, existing and future federal categorical grants-in-aid. Some
of the funds would be passed through state governments to local governments.
The legislation that Congressman Reuss has proposed in two bills3
differs substantially from the traditional model. Unlike most revenuesharing proposals the Reuss plan provides for a two-year federallyfunded study by each of the states to determine how to modernize their
governmental structures and intergovernmental relationships. At the
end of the planning period, each state desiring to receive further federal
funds would submit its plan to a "coordinating committee" of regional
governors, who would review the proposals, suggest modifications, and
recommend to the President those propositions that demonstrate "sufficient creative state initiative" for governmental reform. After consulting
with the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, the
'Turnbull, Federal Revenue Sharing, 29 MD. L. REv. 344 (1969).
'Turnbull, Restricting the Unrestricted Grants-Analyzing a Revenue Sharing
Myth, 2 UnnAN LAWYER 63 (1970).

- H.R. 1166, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 11764, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.

(1969). The two bills are identical.
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President, again applying the criterion of "creative state initiative" for
governmental reform, would decide which plans are worthy of federal
funding. While Mr. Reuss' proposal wisely requires two years of evaluation and study, it contains an apparently unrecognized potential for
gubernatorial back-scratching or back-stabbing, as the case may be.
Funds under the Reuss proposal, again unlike traditional revenuesharing plans, would be subject to the annual appropriation process for
the reason, among others, that Congress should be the final arbiter of national priorities. In addition, because the Reuss plan would provide for
appropriation of fixed sums (22.5 billion dollars over three years) rather
than allocation of amounts based on increasing percentages of constantly
growing federal income tax receipts, it probably would not be as responsive to economic growth as other revenue-sharing plans.
The major difference between the Reuss proposal and other plans lies
in the requirement of federal review of state governmental modernization
plans. Under both of his bills, each state must set forth plans and timetables for modernizing and revitalizing state and local governments. The
plans must include such matters as:
(1) Solutions of interstate problems by compacts dealing with regional cooperation in health, education, welfare, and conservation;
(2) Programs for strengthening state governments by constitutional, statutory, and administrative changes, including recommendations
concerning more effective and efficient executives and legislatures, state
borrowing powers, personnel systems, and taxation (with imposition of a
state income tax of at least modest progressiveness) ;
(3) Proposals for strengthening and modernizing rural, urban, and
metropolitan governments by constitutional, statutory, and administrative
changes; and
(4) Proposals for spending the federal distribution in ways calculated
to effect these changes.
The proposed legislation can be read as setting forth suggested programs for reforming state governments; the list of reforms seems to be
hortatory, permissive, and suggestive. However, the bills also can be
read as requiring that the states' plans adopt some of the listed reforms
as requisites (in practice, if not in law) for obtaining approval of the
governors' regional coordinating committee, the Advisory Commission and
the President. Given Mr. Reuss' advocacy of the legislation, the latter
construction would seem to indicate the intention of the draftsman.
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Mr. Reuss clearly believes that state and local governments are inadequate, and he is doubtful that they are capable of reforming themselves.
He is profoundly distrustful of state and local governments-and he attempts to justify his attitude by frequent documentation. He argues that
there is a need to reduce the number of counties; to reduce the number
of (or eliminate altogether) local governments that are too small to provide efficient administration; to concentrate on a single responsive executive for each local unit; to reform personnel practices by basing them uniformly on merit and competence; to grant adequate home-rule powers
to "reformed" counties and other local governments; to increase direct
support by the state of such local activities as health, education, welfare,
and housing; to revise the terms of state grants-in-aid and shared taxes
in order to encourage "modern local governments" and to minimize the
differences in local fiscal capacity; to ease restrictions on local property
taxes and on borrowing powers of local governments; to improve local
property tax administration; and to authorize local governments to impose and better utilize nonproperty taxes. Local governments in metropolitan areas should be strengthened by liberalizing methods of municipal annexation of unincorporated areas, by discouraging new incorporations not meeting minimum standards of total population and population
density, by authorizing transfers of specified functions between municipalities and counties, and by permitting intergovernmental contracts for the
provision of services. Local governments in metropolitan areas should be
allowed to exercise extra-territorial planning and zoning in unincorporated areas, and zoning authority should be restricted to larger municipalities and counties. States should authorize local councils of government; create metropolitan planning agencies; and furnish state financial
and technical assistance in areas of planning, building codes, urban renewal, consolidation, governmental structure, and governmental finance.
After crying out with alarm about "ultralocalism," about inadequacy
of state and local governments, and about needed reforms, Mr. Reuss
finally makes his argument. He urges the use of federal funds (block
grants) -not as a crutch to prop up the states and prevent them from
achieving reform, but rather as a financial catalyst that will cause them
to undertake creative self-initiated reform. This is the most significant
point in Mr. Reuss' proposals: he marries revenue sharing to modernization of state and local governments.
The unique characteristic of a traditional revenue-sharing concept is
that it grants relatively unconditional aid to state and local governments.
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Essentially, the traditional program is inextricably linked with concepts
of "Creative Federalism"-concepts postulating that there is an imbalance in the federal-state-local partnership that can be redressed in part
through revenue sharing. Mr. Reuss' variation, on the other hand, as I
have argued elsewhere, 4 is extremely restrictive and non-permissive, and
cuts so far into the concept of "Creative Federalism" that its wisdom is
indeed open to doubt. It would involve the federal government in the
morass and variety of state administration. One surely must have serious
questions concerning at least the administrative feasibility of such involvement.
While I previously had serious reservations about Mr. Reuss' proposal's mutilation of the essential concepts of revenue sharing and about
some of the administrative difficulties his plan posed, now, after reading
this book, I conclude that Mr. Reuss, who purports to be in favor of
revenue sharing and who undoubtedly is a proponent of reform of state
and local governments, may have transformed himself into one of the
worst enemies of revenue sharing. His book is almost too persuasive,
too graphic for his cause. It reads like a Doomsday list for state and
local governments. Mr. Reuss assumes that the financial catalyst of
block grants will persuade and enable the states to modernize and reform
themselves, but he implies, more clearly than perhaps he intended, that
opponents of unrestricted grants through revenue sharing may be correct
in asserting that the only way state and local governments will become
stronger partners in the federal system is through federal aid conditioned
on reform.
Finally, Mr. Reuss envisions such wholesale alterations in state and
local governments, consistent with his enumerated catalogue of necessary
reforms, that not only will proponents of reform despair because so many
changes may be politically infeasible, but also advocates of revenue sharing
will appear ludicrous for advancing such a scheme-ludicrous because of
the many conditions affixed to the "unconditional" grants. In short,
Mr. Reuss may have authored a book that will be more harmful than
helpful to the cause of one of the most worthy programs of "Creative
Federalism"-unrestricted sharing of federal wealth with state and local
governments.
H. RUTHERFORD TURNBULL, III
Assistant Professor, The Institute of Government
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Turnbull, supra note 1, at 356-66 nn.94 & 96.

